Empirical Research Partners Michael L. Goldstein Longying Zhao 212 803-8010 212 803-8010 212 803-7940

Portfolio Strategy April 2024 Market Valuation: A Deal Breaker? Higher Real Rates: Implications for Stock Selection

Valuing the S&P 500: Do the Assumptions Make Sense?

- We did work modeling the valuation of the S&P 500 and concluded that today it's correctly valued, using our basecase assumptions. The two most important considerations in the exercise are the payout rate of earnings and the level of real long-term interest rates. Payouts have been climbing for decades, as buybacks became the norm. The market produces a 19% ROE and in the last ten years around 75% of it has been returned to shareholders via dividends and buybacks. By comparison, four decades ago the overall payout rate was about half that level. That increase has meant that over time stocks have become more of a bird-in-the-hand proposition, and that's boosted the market's multiple. There's been a wall of worry to climb, and stock selection strategies based on a total yield calculation have long been successful, generating +3 to +4 points of alpha a year. The outlook for free cash flow generation remains constructive, and we're assuming that a 70% total payout ratio will be the norm. If 60% is the right number, the market is 13% overvalued, and if it's 80%, it's undervalued by 10%.
- Real interest rates are a second, and even more critical part of the equation, and unfortunately they're the hardest variable to fathom. Real ten-year Treasury bond yields are currently +250 basis points, one of the highest levels since Spring of 2006, before that, 2002, and equal to the average over the last four decades. In the 2010s they were just +60 basis points. There's a long list of factors that influence them, and lately it's been topped by the U.S.' structural budget deficit and government debt burden. Real long rates are up by +100 basis points this year, driven primarily by the strength of the economy, and our presumption is that pop will prove temporary. Our base case assumption is +150 basis points, although if +200 is the right number the market is 14% overvalued, while if it's +100, it's undervalued by an equivalent amount.
- Other, somewhat less important inputs to the modeling process are the growth rate of earnings and the equity risk premium, here measured relative to the total return of 10 ten-year Treasury bonds. We're assuming that earnings increases will outpace the nominal growth rate of the U.S. economy by +150 to +250 basis points per annum, with the terminal premium varying from zero to +50 basis points. In the last 10- and 30-year spans that differential has topped +4 percentage points, but we're being conservative, because at some point the laws of gravity will take hold. A ± 50 basis point swing in earnings growth changes the fair value of the market by $\pm 5\%$. Finally, the equity risk premium has been in the 4% to 6% range over the very long run and in recent decades as well, and we're assuming 4.75%. A ± 25 basis point move in the risk premium alters the market's fair value by $\pm 6\%$.
- The assumptions that one needs to make to justify the market's current forward multiple of 21 times don't seem crazy, but there's little room for error. In the short run, real interest rates are the biggest unknown, and we've already seen a large spike in them this year. This exercise leads us to think that the market's valuation is in the neutral range, and that's also the tale being told by our Regime Indicator and valuation spreads. Given all of that, we want to have a broadly diversified portfolio and not make any sudden moves. We continue to barbell big cash flowgenerating growth stocks against lower-multiple financial and cyclical issues.

Higher Real Interest Rates: Implications for Stock Selection

We examined how the level of real interest rates has impacted the rules for stock selection, drawing on more than 70 years of data. We found that when the discount rate is up, the here and now counts more. Our Valuation and Capital Deployment Super Factors perform better when real rates are higher. Growth stocks without current earnings struggle in that setting, and our Failure Model enjoys a tailwind. Appendix 1 presents large-cap issues that rank in the top quintiles of both our Capital Deployment Super Factor and our Core Model.

Nicole Price (212) 803-7935 Sungsoo Yang (212) 803-7925 Yi Liu (212) 803-7942 Yu Bai (212) 803-7919 Sean Duncan (212) 803-7965 Janai Haynes (212) 803-8005

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Conclusions in Brief

• The market appears to be correctly valued...



• The combined payout rate...



• Higher real rates mean that valuation...



• ...Based on a somewhat conservative set of assumptions:



• ...And real interest rates are the most important swing factors when estimating fair value:



• ...And capital deployment count more:



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Market Valuation: A Deal Breaker?

Sizing Up the Data

Strategists have a longstanding reputation as market timers, making big calls advising entry and exit points. Some of them have worked out, but on the whole they've turned out to be destructive, to both returns and careers. We've never played that game because it has poor odds of success, is already overpopulated, and it's very hard to have an edge. Stock picking, that involves making many more bets, is a better use of resources. Occasionally though, it's sensible to survey the landscape to see if the assumptions implicit in the market's valuation make sense. We're doing that now because this year its multiple has held up in the face of rising nominal and real interest rates.

We can see the effect of the higher rates in Exhibit 1, that compares the trailing free cash flow yield of the large-cap market to that offered by ten-year Treasury bonds. At present the yield of stocks is more than (90) basis points less than that of the Bond, the widest spread since June of 2002. The deficit was however much wider throughout the entirety of the previous four decades. The S&P 500 is currently selling at about 21 times this year's estimated earnings, that are expected to be up by about +10%, a reasonable forecast (see Exhibit 2). That's one of the higher forward multiples of the last 46 years, and the same is true of the trailing version (see Exhibit 3).



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Corporate Reports, National Bureau of Economic Research, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

¹Excludes financial and utilities; capitalization-weighted composite



Source: Corporate Reports, National Bureau of Economic Research, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

'Capitalization-weighted data.



Source: Corporate Reports, National Bureau of Economic Research, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.



Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Robert Shiller, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Valuing the Market: What Do We Need to Believe?

We used a dividend discount model to ferret out the assumptions underlying the current valuation of the market. In this research we'll describe the inputs to the process, with the first being the growth rate of earnings. Exhibit 4 (overleaf) compares it to that of the U.S. economy, on a ten-year moving average basis. Earnings have grown +4.5 points a year faster than the economy since 1992, while in the prior 30 years the opposite was true and there was a (1.5) point deficit. In the last ten years the premium was +4.25 points per annum. As we've often pointed out, falling interest and tax rates have been among the forces that pushed margins higher, and we see that in the gap between EBIT and net margins (see Exhibit 5). It narrowed in the 2010s, largely the consequence of the tax cut of 2017.



We modeled a number of scenarios where S&P 500 earnings grow by anywhere from +50 to +250 basis points per annum faster than the economy over our explicit forecast horizon of 15 years earnings. In the terminal period thereafter we tried two alternatives: +50 basis points, our base case, and parity. Of course, trees don't grow to the sky, and Exhibit 6 depicts the ratio of market earnings-to-GDP under the various scenarios. In 2004 the ratio was 4.5%, and now it's more than 7.5%. The share of earnings that's sourced outside the U.S. is around 40%, and when we adjust for that fact, the ratio rises to around 5% (see Exhibit 7). That forecast seems plausible.



Source: Corporate Reports, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Bureau of Economic Research, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

'Adjusted for special Items.

¹Based on trailing four-quarter data; measured as aggregates and smoothed on a trailing three-month basis.

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A second, and even more critical input to the calculation is the share of earnings that can be paid out to shareholders. Exhibit 8 (overleaf) presents the history of that ratio since 1972, accounting for both dividends and net buybacks. The dividend payout ratio today is about 35%, no different from what it was 30 years ago. What's changed is the impact from buybacks, that add another 35 to 40 points to the combined ratio. The current ratio, that's more than 70%, is nearly double the average from 1977 through 2003. Buybacks have been central to the capital return equation for more than 30 years.

What's enabled the payout is the market's enormous free cash flow generation, and those margins have been trending higher for decades (see Exhibit 9). Their persistent rise has been a function of increasing profitability accompanied by declining capital intensity (see Exhibit 10). The ascent of the hyper-profitable tech sector, that now sources 40% of the market's output of free cash flow, has been a big part of the story (see Exhibit 11).



The return on, and of capital, makes the S&P 500 a formidable competitor to other asset classes. It now generates 19% ROE, that's +5 percentage points above the long-term average (see Exhibit 12). At present 13 points of it is being returned to shareholders, making equities more of a bird-in-the-hand proposition than in the past (see Exhibit 13). That linchpin of the market's valuation seems sustainable, and we modeled payout ratios varying from 60% to 80%.



Turning to the Discount Rate

In estimating the discount rate to be applied to future earnings we began with the ten-year vear inflation expectations derived from the Cleveland Fed Model, that draws upon both market data and surveys. The latest estimate is +2.3%, and that seems like a reasonable guess (see Exhibit 14). Figuring out the appropriate real long-term interest rate is a dicier matter, and that's an issue we've addressed repeatedly in our research.¹ Our base case is that the normal level is +150 basis points. The current reading though is about +250 basis points, a level that was topped last October, and before that in the Spring of 2006 (see Exhibit 15). The volatility of the bond market conveys considerable uncertainty about where normal lies (see Exhibit 16). The country's debt burden is a major consideration in the real rate guessing game, but there are a slew of other issues that matter as well, including demographics, the supply of "safe assets" and the mis-measurement of inflation. Precision is a pipedream, and we modeled scenarios where real rates vary from +100 to +250 basis points.



Source: Corporate Reports, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

^{&#}x27;Based on trailing four-quarter data; measured as aggregates and smoothed on a trailing three-month basis.



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Federal Reserve Board, National Bureau of Economic Research, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

¹Less the trailing three-month average of ten-year inflation expectations as estimated by the Cleveland Fed model



Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, National Bureau of Economic Research, Empirical Research Partners Analysis,

Exhibit 16: Bond Market Volatility Index 1988 Through March 2024



Source: National Bureau of Economic Research, Bank of America Merrill Lvnch.

1Portfolio Strategy May 2023. "Real Rates: Higher or Lower Ahead?" Portfolio Strategy October 2023. "Equity Market: Fatter Tails;" Portfolio Strategy December 2023. "Grasping at Economic Reality: Technology, AI and Interest Rates;" Portfolio Strategy January 2024 "Real Rates Redux: Is a Deficit Debacle on the Horizon?

Finally, there's the matter of the equity risk premium, that in this case is calculated relative to the total return of tenyear Treasuries. Over the long run it's averaged between +4% and +5%, and that's what CFOs, academics and investors are currently forecasting (see Exhibit 17). Since the Financial Crisis the implied risk premium built into the market's valuation has varied from between +4.5% and +6% (see Exhibit 18). We created five scenarios using premia of +4% to +5.5%.



The Results of the Modeling Process

When modeling the valuation of the S&P 500 our base case relied upon the following assumptions: earnings will grow +150 basis points faster than the U.S. economy for the next 15 years and +50 basis points faster thereafter. The all-in payout ratio (i.e., dividends + net buybacks) will average 70% over that span, real ten-year Treasury bond rates will be +150 basis points, and the equity risk premium will come in at 4.75%. Exhibit 19 compares those assumptions to the averages of the past 10-, 20- and 30-year spans. While what we're assuming appears to be conservative, we're nonetheless extrapolating the exceptional fundamentals of the last several decades. Our forecasts of the earnings growth premium and the payout ratio depend on the continued dominance of the tech sector. While exercises of this sort are inevitably based on backward-looking observations, that could be proven all wrong, they do at least provide us with a framework for thinking about the assumptions that underpin the market's valuation.



Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis, Aswath Damodaran, 2024. "Equity Risk Premiums (ERP): Determinants, Estimation, and Implications -The 2024 Edition." Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Exhibits 20 through 23 present our results expressed as the differential between the current level of the S&P 500 (i.e., 5,100) and our estimate of fair value. A positive number means the market is overvalued, a negative one that it's undervalued. The market today looks to be about correctly valued when we use our base case assumption. Exhibit 20 (overleaf) presents a sensitivity analysis based on the forecast earnings growth premium versus the economy. If the earnings growth premium turns out to be +50 basis points rather than +150 basis points, or is zero in the terminal period, the market is around 10% overvalued. If, on the other hand, the growth premium turns out to be +250 basis points, it's approximately 10% undervalued. A premium of +250 basis points in the forecast period and zero in the terminal one leaves us with a fairly valued market.

The modeling results are sensitive to the level of the combined payout ratio, and reversal of the longstanding run of free cash flow margin expansion could produce some serious pressure on multiples (see Exhibit 21). We've assumed the payout levels of the last 20 years will persist. The level of real interest rates also figures large in the equation, and is a wildcard (see Exhibit 22). The equity risk premium could turn out to be a swing factor too, although that seems less likely (see Exhibit 23).



Conclusion: Like Much Else, Neutral

The conclusion we reach from this work is that at the moment the market looks to be appropriately valued, based on a reasonably conservative set of assumptions. If the trend of rising multiples is to be turned on its head, the most likely culprits would be a marked decline in free cash flow generation, or a sustained rise in real interest rates. The latter is harder to fathom and seems likelier, and today politics and the budget deficit figure large in the outlook. Most of our indicators, including that which forecasts market regime, are in the neutral zone, and our conclusions about market valuation fall in there too (see Exhibit 24). Given all of that, we want to have a broadly-diversified portfolio construction.



Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis

Higher Real Interest Rates: Implications for Stock Selection

The Rules of the Road Have Been Lodged

The real interest rate on ten-year Treasury bonds is currently 2.5%, and over the last year it's averaged 2% (see Exhibit 15 on page 6). In the prior decade it was barely positive, and that compares to an average of 2.5% over the last 70 years. We've estimated that for the remainder of the 2020s real rates might average 1.5% to 1.6%, but there's tremendous uncertainty surrounding that forecast. The expansion of the country's budget deficit and government debt burden is today the deterministic element in the equation.

As we described earlier, real rates, along with free cash flow production, are the critical swing factors in the market's valuation equation. It's logical that they should influence the rules for stock picking as well, and a higher discount rate should mean that the here and now counts more. We examined the evidence, going back to the early-1950s, and found that was indeed the case.

Our Valuation Super Factor has performed best when real rates were high, and worst when they were low (see Exhibit 25). Their current level ranks in the middle quintile of the distribution seen since 1952. We see the same pattern in the return data for free cash flow yields (see Exhibit 26). The market's focus on the deployment of capital is influenced by the discount rate as well, and investors are more critical of big spenders when it's elevated (see Exhibit 27). Conversely, higher real rates have boosted the performance of buyback strategies (see Exhibit 28).



At the other end of the spectrum, growth stocks without current earnings have struggled in settings of higher real rates, as investors are less patient in such settings (see Exhibit 29). Our Failure Model, that looks to that the pool for ideas, has done well in those periods (see Exhibit 30).

Stock Selection: Balance is Best

If real rates are to be materially higher in this decade than the last one, more than just top-line growth will be important when picking stocks. The price of admission, capital deployment and production of free cash flow will be relevant considerations as well. Our Core Stock Selection Model dynamically balances a diverse set of perspectives in creating expected returns (see Exhibit 31). It's done well when real rates were in the top-half of the distribution, and that's been true lately (see Exhibit 32).

Appendix 1 on page 11 presents large-cap stocks that rank in the top quintiles of both our Capital Deployment Super Factor and the Core Model, usually a winning combination.



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.





Source: Federal Reserve Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.



By Quintiles of Real Rates Monthly Data Compounded to Annual Periods 1954 Through March 2024 % 0 (2) (4) (6) (8) (10)(12) (14)(16) (18)

Quintiles of Real Rates Source: Federal Reserve Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Second

Third

Fourth

Lowest

Quintile

Highest

Quintile

Exhibit 31: The Core Model **Exhibit 32: Large-Capitalization Stocks** Forward Relative Returns of the Best and Worst **Super Factor Weightings Ouintiles of the Core Model** 1952 Through Late-April 2024 **By Quintiles of Real Rates** Monthly Data Compounded to Annual Periods 1952 Through March 2024 % Machine 18 Learning 15 12 Valuation 9 6 Market Reaction 3 0 (3) (6) (9) (12) Highest Second Third Fourth Lowest Memo: Quintile Quintile 12 Months Earnings Quality Capital Ending Ouintiles of Real Rates Late-April Deployment 🗉 Best Quintile Worst Quintile 2024

Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Source: Federal Reserve Board, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Empirical Research Partners Analysis

Appendix 1: Large-Capitalization Stocks Top Quintiles of Capital Deployment and the Core Model Sorted by Capitalization As of Late-April 2024

| | | | Quintile Ranks (1=Best; 5=Worst) | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------|-----------|----------|----------|-----------|-------|---------|------------|----------------|--|
| | | | Super Factors | | | | | | Memo: | | | |
| | | | | | Earnings | Earnings | | | Free | | | |
| | | | | | Quality | | Machine | Core | Cash | Forward | Market | |
| | | | Capital | | and | Market | Learning | Model | Flow | P/E- | Capitalization | |
| Symbol | Company | Price | Deployment | Valuation | Trend | Reaction | Algorithm | Rank | Yield | Ratio | (\$ Billion) | |
| V | VISA INC | \$275.02 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 26.4 x | \$552.8 | |
| HD | HOME DEPOT INC | 333.01 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 21.7 | 330.3 | |
| MRK | MERCK & CO | 127.00 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 14.9 | 321.6 | |
| ABBV | ABBVIE INC | 167.80 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15.2 | 297.1 | |
| ADBE | ADOBE INC | 477.12 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 26.0 | 216.1 | |
| NVS | NOVARTIS AG | 98.35 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 13.5 | 213.6 | |
| BABA | ALIBABA GROUP HLDG | 74.63 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9.1 | 191.5 | |
| BKNG | BOOKING HOLDINGS INC | 3,517.52 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 19.9 | 121.0 | |
| LMT | LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP | 459.14 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 17.3 | 110.2 | |
| VRTX | VERTEX PHARMACEUTICALS INC | 400.76 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 24.1 | 103.5 | |
| BMY | BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB CO | 48.86 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 82.0 | 99.0 | |
| EQNR | EQUINOR ASA | 27.10 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9.0 | 81.3 | |
| MPC | MARATHON PETROLEUM CORP | 199.14 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10.6 | 73.3 | |
| HMC | HONDA MOTOR CO LTD | 34.41 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 7.3 | 61.0 | |
| VLO | VALERO ENERGY CORP | 167.00 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9.7 | 55.7 | |
| CRH | CRH PLC | 77.63 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 14.7 | 53.7 | |
| DHI | D R HORTON INC | 146.12 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 10.1 | 48.2 | |
| ADSK | AUTODESK INC | 215.00 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 26.9 | 46.0 | |
| CNC | CENTENE CORP | 76.19 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | i | 1 | 11.3 | 40.8 | |
| LYB | LYONDELLBASELL INDUSTRIES NV | 100.78 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | i | i | 12.3 | 32.8 | |
| GRMN | GARMINITD | 142 79 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | i | 3 | 26.7 | 27.4 | |
| PHM | PULTEGROUPINC | 112.26 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | i | 1 | 8.9 | 23.6 | |
| ΝΤΑΡ | NETAPP INC | 100.06 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | i | 2 | 15 1 | 20.7 | |
| IPIA | | 264 54 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | i | na | 16.6 | 19.7 | |
| WSM | | 285 51 | 1 | 1 | i | ĩ | 1 | i | 1 | 18.6 | 183 | |
| СНКР | CHECK POINT SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGIES | 161.00 | 1 | 2 | i | i | i | i | 2 | 17.8 | 18.2 | |
| CSI | CARLISLE COS INC | 375 30 | 1 | 3 | 2 | i | i | i | 2 | 20.2 | 17.9 | |
| GDDY | GODADDY INC | 123.83 | i | 2 | 2 | i | i | i | 2 | 26.3 | 17.5 | |
| AVY | | 212 42 | 1 | 3 | 2 | i | 4 | i | 3 | 21.9 | 17.1 | |
| CRBG | | 27.16 | 1 | 1 | 2 | i | 2 | i | na | 5.6 | 16.9 | |
| FXPD | EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL WAS | 112.87 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | i | 2 | 23.8 | 16.2 | |
| PKG | | 173.92 | 1 | 3 | 1 | i | 2 | i | 2 | 20.1 | 15.6 | |
| MAS | MASCO CORP | 69.74 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | i | 1 | 16.4 | 15.0 | |
| | | 165.22 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | i | 1 | 11.2 | 14.4 | |
| RPM | | 107.03 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 4 | i | 1 | 20.3 | 13.9 | |
| | | 87.00 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | i | 2 | 20.5 | 12.8 | |
| TOI | | 118 70 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | i | 1 | 8.6 | 12.0 | |
| RID | | 288.27 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 18.0 | 12.4 | |
| | | 51 74 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 11.8 | 12.4 | |
| | | 20.06 | 1 | 1 | 5 | | 1 | 1 | 2 | 8.0 | 11.0 | |
| | | 57 / 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.0 8 / | 11.0 | |
| VD | | 20.64 | 1 | 1 | + | 2 | 3 | 1 | ı na | 122 | 11.3 | |
| DI | | 168 21 | 1 | 1 | 7 | 7 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 15.3 | 10.8 | |
| | | 100.21 | I | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | I. | 13.5 | 10.0 | |
| Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis | | | | | | | | | | | | |