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## Global Portfolio Strategy April 2017 Dollar Moves and Their Implications for International Equities Regime Change in Japan: Back to Neutral

Dollar Moves: Many Moving Pieces

- Since mid-2014 the trade-weighted Dollar has appreciated by +23%, a move that's left its *inflation-adjusted* level in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of the distribution since 1973, just (14)% below the peak seen in 1985. By comparison the Euro, Yen and Pound stand in the 40<sup>th</sup>, 29<sup>th</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> percentiles of their historic distributions. The impact from Dollar moves on international equities is complex and unstable in character.
- Moves in exchange rates can impact profitability through translation effects that are affected by the currencies used for invoicing. Japanese exporters invoice 50% of their shipments in dollars, while the equivalent number for Euro-Area companies is about a third. 60% of the Euro-Area companies' shipments are invoiced in their own currency. That explains why passthrough rates are higher for Japanese exporters, as moves in the Dollar are almost fully reflected in their top line. Translation effects aren't as weighty for Euro-Area exporters.
- Complicating the matter, the determinants of Dollar moves are time-varying. Dollar strength can result from mounting fears, or conversely, faster U.S. growth vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Dollar strength would also result from the implementation of a destination-based tax in the U.S., putting Japanese exporters most at risk. The U.S. is the destination for a fifth of their shipments, while it's the end market for just 7% of the output of their Euro-Area counterparts. Moreover, a tax on imports would hurt the U.S. operations of German and Japanese auto makers that have trade deficits of (19)% and (11)% respectively, while subsidiaries of machinery, computer and electronics makers show modest surpluses.
- We ranked the international issues based on the correlation of their relative returns with Dollar moves and among the top-decile names the financials are a standout, making up 34% of the cohort. A big part of that is comprised by European financials and within that region they make to 50% of the most-correlated names. That's consistent with our view of European banks being the biggest beneficiaries from President Trump's policies because of the inflationary implications they pack and their flow-through to the Dollar. Appendix 1 on page xx provides the list of international large-cap issues in the top-decile of correlation of relative returns with the moves in the Greenback, with European financials a standout.

#### Regime Change in Japan: Back to Neutral

- At the end of March our regime indicator in Japan shifted from a value-tilted stance to a neutral one. Among our regime indicators the one in Japan had been the only that remained in a value-oriented position. Since it moved to a value-tilted position, value has outperformed by about +17 percentage points, but the outperformance has weakened in the last few months. A value strategy could continue to be useful because, historically, when the regime indicator switched to a neutral stance, value generated on average a +5 percentage point outperformance in the following year across the non-U.S. developed world.
- Last July we favored industrial cyclicals (i.e., industrial commodities and capital goods) as their relative free cash flow yields were in the top-decile of history. They've since revalued as worries regarding Chinese growth have waned and the Yen has weakened. Our conviction on these stocks is now lower.

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## **Conclusions in Brief**

• The currency impact on companies is complex, and the invoicing currency matters:



• A destination-based tax in the U.S. would hurt the operations of foreign automakers there:



 Valuation spreads narrowed in Japan and our regime indicator has shifted to a neutral stance:



• European exporters adjust their prices to currency changes, their U.S. peers don't:



• The group of stocks with relative returns correlated to Dollar moves is skewed towards financials:



• The value case for Japanese industrial cyclicals has weakened somewhat:



## **Dollar Moves and Their Implications for International Equities**

#### The Currency of Invoice Matters

Since the Financial Crisis currency movements within the developed world have been large, resulting in noticeable shifts in competitiveness. The nominal trade-weighted U.S. Dollar is a good example of that, steadily appreciating by +33% since it bottomed in early-2011 and by +23% since mid-2014 when it shot upward. It now sits close to a 15-year high (see Exhibit 1). A better proxy of a country's competitive position, though, is provided by the *real* effective exchange rate, and on that metric the U.S. Dollar is in the 90<sup>th</sup> percentile of richness since 1973, (14)% below the 1985 peak, while the Euro, Yen and Pound are at much lower readings (see Exhibit 2).



Global trade is disproportionately invoiced in dollars (see Exhibit 3), so that currency's moves could impact the bottom line of the companies through different channels. We've done some work on that, looking at the effect on export prices as well as the impact on the margins of cyclical companies.



Source: Gita Gopinath, October 2015 "The International Price System," NBER Working Paper No. 21646.

<sup>1</sup> The invoicing for the U.S. and Euro Area are expressed in U.S. dollars and euros, respectively.

Source: Eurostat, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

The most obvious and direct impact of currency moves are translation effects, but the larger consequences depend on a number of other factors. One important dimension, often forgotten, is the currency invoicing composition in international trade. Japanese exporters invoice only a small proportion in Yen, and about 50% in dollars. European exporters stand midway, with about half of their trade invoiced in euros, owing to the fact that a large part of their activity is with other parts of the European continent, leaving about a third of the total to be denominated in dollars (see Exhibit 4 overleaf).

Those compositional differences explain why the passthrough in export prices has been quite different in Japan and Europe. Japan is a price taker, exporting essentially in dollars, so a move in the latter is almost fully reflected in the exporters' top line, at least in the short-run (see Exhibit 5). That behavior is reflected in the macroeconomic data, and the ECB recently noted that the reaction of Japanese exports to the Yen's depreciation during Abenomics had been modest, consistent with Japan's invoicing practices.<sup>1</sup> That could explain why the correlation between the Yen's moves and those of Japanese stocks has been close to 95% over that period. We've been repeatedly asked at what point will Japanese stocks stop following the Yen moves, given the circumstances we doubt that'll happen any time soon. By comparison the translation effects are more limited in Europe as 60% of their exports are invoiced in euros (see Exhibit 6).



#### The Passthrough From Euro-Dollar Moves on European and U.S. Export Prices

We find that moves in the exchange rate aren't *fully* passed through to prices of exported goods, a conclusion that's consistent with the academic literature. The auto sector provides a good case study as shown in Exhibit 7. A depreciation of the Euro against the Dollar, as has been the case since May 2014, has been associated with an increase in relative export prices of European autos (priced in euros) compared to those of their U.S. counterparts (priced in dollars). This again is a function of the invoicing currency. Because European exporters invoice part of their shipments in dollars, an appreciation of the Greenback without a commensurate price-tag adjustment would result in higher export prices when translated in euros. By contrast, because almost all U.S. exports are invoiced in dollars, its moves wouldn't impact the export deflator of those country's exporters.

Importantly though, the passthrough rate from the exchange rate to export prices is much lower than 1:1, suggesting that exporters do adjust their price-tag to some extent. They use the depreciation of their local currency to lower prices in foreign currency, conversely their margins don't fully absorb the appreciation of their local currency, rather they increase their selling prices in foreign currency.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> ECB Economic Bulletin, Issue 3/2015, Box I pp. 15-18.

Comparing the U.S. and the Euro Area on a number of sectors, we find that a one percentage point strengthening in the Euro compared to the Dollar results in a decrease of between (5) and (10) basis points in the Euro-based prices of European exports (see Exhibit 8). With 30% of them priced in dollars this suggests that less than half of the currency moves are reflected in prices.



The effect is *even* more muted for U.S. companies, with export prices barely budging across those categories after moves in the Dollar-Euro exchange rate, save for those of non-durable consumer goods. That's consistent with the fact that U.S. exporters invoice about 97% of their exports in dollars.<sup>2</sup>

We find, nevertheless, that U.S. companies absorb *some* of the Dollar appreciation in their margins by cutting prices for their exports. Those for U.S. autos have steadily declined by one percentage point since they peaked in 2014. The case is more extreme for exports of non-auto consumer durable goods, with prices declining by (7)% since they peaked in 2012. However, since then, domestic prices for those goods fell by (9)%, so the additional markup for exports amounted to only +2 percentage points.

One reason why passthrough rates have gone down is that companies have moved production closer to the end user. Data from the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry show that nominal exports of Japanese firms have grown by slightly more than 50% between 1999 and 2014, but revenues of their overseas subsidiaries have more than tripled over the same period.

#### Effect on Competitiveness: European and Japanese Cyclicals

Dollar moves could have implications on the margin behavior of the companies. In Continental Europe global cyclicals are the most sensitive to a move in the exchange rate (see Exhibit 9). By contrast, in Japan, it's more the domestic ones that are affected (see Exhibit 10). We think this boils down, to a large extent, to differences in their cost structures.

The reaction of the global cyclicals' revenues is higher in Japan than in Continental Europe, consistent with the view expressed earlier that Japanese exporters are more price takers in international trade than European ones. But in terms of their cost structure, Japan is also more impacted, as nearly 70% of Japan's imports are invoiced in dollars. In short, even the cyclicals in Japan that we regard as domestic are heavily influenced by the fate of the Yen, that's another reason to believe that the Japanese stock market performance won't de-correlate from the moves in the Yen.

This analysis highlights once more the complexity of the currency impact on the companies, translation effects being only one side of it, while differences in cost structures matter too and could lead to an opposite reaction.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Gita Gopinath, October 2015 "The International Price System," NBER Working Paper No. 21646.



#### The U.S. Border Tax's Implications on Japanese and European Exporters

The implementation of a destination-based tax in the U.S. will lead to an appreciation of the Dollar, although it's difficult to predict how much the adjustment will be and how long it will take (see Exhibit 11). Forecasting the impact on international equities is difficult, but we did some basic work looking at the exposure of European and Japanese companies to the U.S. market through the prism of their exports and the operations of their U.S.-based foreign affiliates, as reported by the BEA. Exhibits 12 and 13 show the regional makeup of Japanese and Euro Area exports. On that front Japanese companies are more exposed to an import tax in the U.S., as that country makes up 20% of Japan's shipments, almost the same share as that made up by China and slightly lower than that made up by the rest of developing Asia. The exposure is much smaller for Euro Area exporters, with the U.S. share close to 7%, about 1/6<sup>th</sup> the share made up by intra-Euro Area exports.



Source: Jason Furman, February 2017. "Border Adjustment as Tax Policy and as Macroeconomic Policy," Peterson Institute for International Economics Conference of Border Tax Adjustment and Corporate Tax Reforms, Federal Reserve Board. Source: Ministry of Finance, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

<sup>1</sup> Using a narrowly-defined set of developed market exchange rates

We found a similar result when comparing the revenues of the U.S.-based affiliates, with the U.S. ones making up 27% of the affiliate total in Japan, while the equivalent number for the Euro Area is 18%. Exhibit 14 shows the trade balances of German, U.K. and Japanese manufacturing affiliates operating in the U.S. Chemicals and technology hardware businesses ran modest surpluses, while German and Japanese autos ran big deficits. A border tax adjustment that penalizes imports while subsidizing exports would be detrimental to the U.S. operations of foreign auto makers.



#### Conclusion: Dollar Strength Favors European Financials

The relationship between Dollar moves and the performance of developed world equity markets is a changing one. Part of that has to do with the Dollar's time-varying characteristics, as its moves have to be considered in a much broader context. In its most basic form, Dollar appreciation can result from mounting fears or, conversely, faster U.S. growth than elsewhere (see Exhibits 15 and 16).



Year-over-year changes are computed each quarter. World real GDP on a quarterly basis through Q2 2016.

<sup>1</sup> Year-over-year changes computed every month.

We believe that, currently, Dollar moves are linked to the market's expectation of the state of the economic cycle, while changes in risk premium have taken a backseat. Exhibit 17 shows what's happened, with the correlation between Dollar moves and the relative returns of fundamentally-stable stocks cut in half since the middle of last year, as shown by the solid line in the chart. The dotted line shows the equivalent result for value stocks, with their anticorrelation, the norm in the post-Crisis period, mostly faded.

In the non-U.S. developed world the financials make up a big part of what's correlated with Dollar strength (see Exhibit 18). That's particularly the case in Europe, where they make almost half of the cohort (see Exhibit 19).



We believe that European banks are the biggest beneficiaries of President Trump's policies, because of the inflationary implications they bear and their flow-through to the Dollar. Their relative returns are highly-levered to the moves in the U.S. yield curve (see Exhibits 20 and 21).<sup>3</sup> In the last three months, as the U.S. President has faced difficulty enacting policy, the level of conviction has faded, and the Dollar lost nearly (4)% of its trade-weighted value. Despite that, we believe the market's view that the ECB will remain accommodative in the face of a procyclical U.S. economy is correct (see Exhibit 22). Appendix 1 on page 11 shows the list of international large-cap stocks in the highest decile of correlation of relative returns with the moves in the Dollar, with European financials a standout.



Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

<sup>1</sup> Equally-weighted USD-hedged returns. Trade-weighted U.S. dollar relative to a basket of developed market exchange rates. Correlations are computed over the trailing 24-months.

Source: Bloomberg L.P., Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

<sup>1</sup> Constructed using trailing 24-month capitalization-weighted returns relative to each market; smoothed on a trailing three-month basis. U.S. stocks are drawn from the large-capitalization market.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Global Portfolio Strategy January 2017. "Pan-European Banks: A Barbell Strategy."





## Regime Change in Japan: Back to Neutral

#### Joining the Pack: Most Regional Regimes Now in Neutral Stances

Since last July, when valuation spreads spiked immediately following the Brexit vote, most of our regional regime indicators had been in either value-tilted or value-driven stances. In October, the regime indicator in Continental Europe was the first to shift back to a neutral position, a move followed at the end of January by the regime indicators in the U.K. and the global one. In the middle of January the U.S. regime indicator also moved to a neutral setting from a value-tilted one. That of Japan eventually followed suit at the end of March (see Exhibit 23).

Currently, all our regional regime indicators are in neutral stances, except that in Continental Europe that moved to a growth-tilted position at the end of February.



While valuation spreads in Japan haven't narrowed as much as in other regions, they're still fractionally above their long-term average. However, they have started to widen again, and the support for a value stance has thus diminished (see Exhibit 24). Two other factors played an important part in regime change. The narrowing of pretax margin differentials is less extreme than before (see Exhibit 25). Finally, credit risk has diminished and bankruptcy rates have fallen (see Exhibit 26).

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#### Value in Japan: Any Upside Left?

We've highlighted previously that a move to a neutral regime setting doesn't necessarily mean that the benefits of a value strategy have been exhausted. Since our regime indicator moved to a value-tilted position in Japan value has outperformed by about +17 percentage points. However, the outperformance has waned recently (see Exhibit 27). We would not infer from this, however, that the value strategy has to be abandoned. In the past, value stocks in the non-U.S. developed markets outperformed even when the regime indicator switched to a neutral stance, generating on average a +5 percentage point outperformance in the following year. So a value strategy could continue to be useful, albeit to a much lesser extent than seen over the past eight months.

An interesting case study is provided by the industrial cyclicals (i.e., industrial commodities and capital goods). We highlighted last July that at the time they were unusually cheap, presenting an interesting opportunity for investors. Our argument is now almost-fully eroded, as relative free cash flow yields have migrated away from top-decile readings, and are currently within the top-quartile of the distribution (see Exhibit 28). Their relative returns are largely influenced by worries about growth in the emerging markets, notably in China, and by the Yen appreciation. With the worries on China now much less, and the Yen's depreciation since Summer, the excess pessimism has been priced out, and our conviction on these stocks is now less.



Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

<sup>1</sup>Equally-weighted USD-hedged returns. Stocks ranked across and returns relative to Japan. The black bars indicate months that the Japanese regime indicator was in a value-tilt stance.

Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis. <sup>1</sup> Capitalization-weighted data relative to Japan.

# Appendix 1: Developed Markets (ex-U.S.): Stocks With Market Capitalizations Above \$10bn Top-Decile of Correlation of Relative Returns with the Moves in the Trade-Weighted U.S. Dollar' As of Early-April 2017

					Quintiles (1=Best; 5=Worst)				st)	Mei	mo			
					Earnings				-	Arbitrage	_			
			Local				Quality			Risk	Forward	YTD		Market
	_	Price	Currency			Capital	and	Market	Core	(1=Lowest;	P/E-	Return		Capitalization
Symbol	Company	(Local)	Code	Correlation	Valuation	Deployment	Trend	Reaction	Model	5=Highest)	Ratio	(Local)		(USD Million)
7203 JP	Toyota Motor Corp.	6,046.00	JPY	48 %	2	4	4	5	3	1	9.1 >	(11.1	) %	\$177,864
7270 JP	Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd.	4,078.00	JPY	48	1	2	1	5	2	2	8.1	(13.1	)	28,226
7309 JP	Shimano Inc.	16,700.00	JPY	45	5	5	2	5	5	4	26.2	(8.9	)	14,337
Retail and C	Other Consumer Cyclicals													
LUX IM	Luxottica Group S.p.A.	51.00	EUR	72 %	4	5	2	3	4	5	26.2 >	(0.2	) %	\$25,935
	Industria de Diseno Textil S.A.	32.74	EUK	44	5	3	2	4	4	1	24.9	0.9	、 、	107,677
9965 JP Media	FAST RETAILING CO. LTD.	55,200.00	JPT	57	2	5	4	4	2	4	52.1	(15.4	)	22,211
ITV LN	ITV plc	2.13	GBP	36 %	4	1	1	4	1	4	13.3 >	3.3	%	\$10,441
Capit al Equi	ipment													
5802 JP	Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd.	1,818.00	JPY	43 %	1	3	3	1	1	2	12.4 >	9.0	%	\$12,807
BA/ LN	BAE Systems plc	6.35	GBP	41	5	5	4	3	5	2	14.7	7.4		24,891
AIR FP	Airbus Group SE	71.36	EUR	39	5	4	4	2	4	2	20.5	13.6		58,779
ASSAB 55 7011 ID	ASSA ABLUT AB Class B Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd	162.40		34	2	2	2 5	5	4	2	12.9	(14.7	、 、	22,505
Commercial	Services and Supplies	40.00	J	74		5	5	5	-	-	12.7	(14.7	,	15,057
BXB AT	Brambles Limited	9.40	AUD	39 %	4	5	4	5	5	5	17.8 >	(23.0	) %	\$11,414
Indust rial C	ommodities													
6988 JP	Nitto Denko Corp.	8,700.00	JPY	42 %	5	3	2	2	5	3	19.1 >	(2.2	) %	\$13,775
AGU CT	Agrium Inc.	127.38	CAD	38	3	3	3	4	4	4	18.0	(4.8	)	13,084
	Ryanair Heldings Rls	14 55	ELID	17 0/		c	2	2	4	2	122 .	0.2	0/	¢10 076
9202 IP	ANA Holdings Inc	341 40	IPY	36	2	4	4	3	4	1	12.5 7	10.3	/0	10 867
Technology	:	541.40	J. 1	50	-	-		5	5	·	12.0	10.5		10,007
Technology	Soft ware and Services													
GIB/A CT	CGI Group Inc. Class A	63.48	CAD	41 %	3	3	3	3	3	1	16.9 >	(1.5	) %	\$14,082
CSU CT	Constellation Software Inc.	651.99	CAD	36	4	1	1	1	1	3	22.3	7.1		10,285
Technology	Hardware and Semiconductors		5110			-				-			~	<b>613 030</b>
SIM FP	S I Microelectronics NV	6 240 00	EUR	44 %	2	1	4	1	1	5	23.5 >	ະ 33.I ຈາ	%	\$13,829
NOKIA FH	Nokia Ovi	0,240.00	FUR	36	4	4	5	5	5	4	24.5	8.0		21,300
Health Care	:	4.55	LOIK	50	-	-	5	5	5	-	22.5	0.0		50,555
Pharmaceut	icals and Biotechnology													
MRK GY	Merck KGaA	106.80	EUR	39 %	4	3	4	4	4	2	16.8 >	. 7.7	%	\$49,464
SAN FP	Sanofi	84.48	EUR	37	2	3	2	2	2	1	14.8	9.9		116,111
ROG VX	Roche Holding Ltd Genusssch.	256.20	CHF	36	3	3	1	4	3	2	16.6	13.7		220,509
7733 ID	- Equipment and Services	4 240 00	IDV	15 %	5	2	5	3	5	2	72.2	5.6	92	\$12.068
6869 IP	Sysmex Corporation	6 760 00	IPY	36	5	3	3	5	5	4	32.7	. 5.0	/0	12,300
FRE GY	Fresenius SE & Co. KGaA	74.84	EUR	33	2	4	2	3	3	1	21.7	0.8		43,840
Consumer S	taples													
2503 JP	Kirin Holdings Company Limited	2,135.00	JPY	56 %	3	4	3	3	4	2	24.4 >	12.3	%	\$17,870
ATD/B CT	Alimentation Couche-Tard Inc. Class B	60.43	CAD	39	3	3	4	4	4	4	17.9	(0.6	)	25,894
2802 JP	Ajinomoto Co. Inc.	2,226.50	JPY	39	4	2	3	5	4	3	21.2	(4.8	)	11,628
2587 JP Financials	Suntory Beverage & Food Ltd.	4,780.00	JPY	37	5	2	2	4	5	2	30.2	(1.5	)	13,563
Banks. Cons	umer Finance and Other													
8802 JP	Mitsubishi Estate Company Limited	2,040.50	JPY	50 %	5	4	4	3	5	2	28.9 >	(12.0	) %	\$25,699
WBC AT	Westpac Banking Corporation	35.21	AUD	49	2	5	4	3	3	1	14.6	8.0		90,200
ISP IM	Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A.	2.51	EUR	47	1	1	5	4	3	4	11.9	3.3		43,982
GLE FP	Societe Generale S.A. Class A	46.32	EUR	46	1	2	4	2	1	4	10.2	(0.9	)	38,819
	Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited	31.97	AUD	46	2	3	4	1	2	1	13.2	5.1		71,669
RARCIN	Barclays PI C	2 21	GRP	39	3	5	4	2	3	2	10.7	(0.0	)	46 195
BNP FP	BNP Paribas SA Class A	61.22	EUR	37	ĩ	2	3	3	1	3	10.6	1.1	, 	79.771
SWEDA SS	Swedbank AB Class A	207.00	SEK	35	1	ī	1	2	1	1	13.6	(0.1	)	26,042
1925 JP	Daiwa House Industry Co. Ltd.	3,179.00	JPY	35	4	4	2	4	5	1	10.9	0.9		18,981
NDA SS	Nordea Bank AB	102.20	SEK	35	1	2	1	1	1	1	12.6	7.0		46,088
Capital Mar	Kets	57.73	CAD	46.0/		,	2	2	2	2	104		\ 0/	621.105
	Macquarie Group Limited	37.72		40 %	2	2	2	3	2	2	13.4 >	28	) 70	351,165
SDR LN	Schroders PLC	30.37	GBP	38	3	3	3	1	2	1	11.3	3.4		10.146
UBSG VX	UBS Group AG	15.80	CHF	36	1	4	4	5	3	3	12.2	(0.9	)	59,791
DBK GY	Deutsche Bank AG	15.70	EUR	36	4	1	5	3	3	5	14.2	2.0		25,251
Insurance														
SREN VX	Swiss Re AG	89.45	CHF	57 %	1	2	2	5	2	1	10.3 >	(7.3	) %	\$31,932
	AXA SA Sampo Qui Class A	23.93	EUR	54	2	3	3	3	2	2	9.8	(0.3	)	60,972
	Sampo Oyj Class A Munich Reinsurance Company	44.17	EUK	49	1	5	2	2	2	1	12.0	5.7		20,177
LGEN LN	Legal & General Group Plc	2.45	GBP	47	2	4	3	2	2	i	11.3	(1.1	)	18.038
SLHN VX	Swiss Life Holding AG	321.40	CHF	45	1	2	4	2	1	1	11.1	11.5		10,222
ALV GY	Allianz SE	172.00	EUR	45	2	3	3	2	2	1	11.1	9.6		82,937
AGN NA	AEGON N.V.	4.71	EUR	42	1	3	5	4	2	4	7.9	(9.9	)	10,348
AV/LN	Aviva pic	5.29	GBP	39	2	3	5	3	3	3	9.9	8.7		26,655
	Turich Insurance Group $\Delta G$	107.95 262.20		39	2	2	2 4	2 5	2	1	12.5	5.0 (0 ⊑	)	13,042
GIM	Assicurazioni Generali S.p.A.	14.77	EUR	37	1	3	4	4	2	5	10.0	4 6	,	24.329
QBE AT	QBE Insurance Group Limited	12.91	AUD	35	3	2	2	5	4	4	15.6	6.7		13,477
Telecommu	nications													
DTE GY	Deutsche Telekom AG	16.40	EUR	36 %	2	3	5	5	4	1	18.6 >	0.3	%	\$81,582
Utilities	Kancai Electric Dower Company, Incorporated	1 205 00	101/	E # 0/		,	2	r	,	F	00	. 10.7	0/	¢11 0C0
9531 IP	Tokyo Gas Co. 1td	1,303.00	JPT IPV	54 % 40	2	2	2	2 4	י ז	2	20.9 >	. 10.3	70 )	10 896
1000		00.01	111	40	4	4	L.	-	L	L.	20.2	(1.4	, 	10,090
Source: Er	npirical Research Partners Analysis.													

<sup>1</sup> Correlations based on relative returns and computed over the trailing 24-months.