

Portfolio Strategy June 2013

Interest Rate Follies

The Bell Tolls, For Whom?

- The Fed signaled that monetary policy is going to become less accommodative setting off a true bear market in bonds. In the last year the losses taken at the long end of the curve have been among the worst in a century, yet unlike during most of the precedents the S&P 500 is up, by more than +20% no less. Perhaps it's turned out that way because the real earnings and cash flow yields started out high and remain that way. The equity market's resilience may also have something to do with the sensitivity of the economy to interest rates or lack thereof.
- We'd expect the rate sensitivity of the system to be greatest after a credit boom, when lots of people have availed themselves of cheap money. In the last few years the price of credit was low but so too was the volume of private-sector borrowing. It amounted to just 4% of GDP, less than half the average of the prior five decades and a quarter the peak level. Mortgages funded under half the value of home purchases, compared to almost 80% during the boom years. Many homeowners simply couldn't access the mortgage market, and at the beginning of this year the average rate they were paying was a record +150 basis points above the marginal one. Even after the latest back-up in yields that gap remains +50 basis points. In the formerly-hot market states cash buyers account for nearly half the activity and rental yields remain compelling. So does affordability. The risk isn't a credit bust, it's disillusioned bond investors.
- In the last 4½ years retail investors have poured \$1.3 *trillion* into bond funds and ETFs, and the bulk of that came in when Ten-Year Treasuries offered less than 3%. Closed-end funds, a relatively small portion of the asset base often use leverage, and ETFs, that promise liquidity, have assets of around \$250 billion. We generally don't believe that analyzing fund flows is a useful activity, but given the enormous sums involved and the clients' expectations for stability, the dawning disillusionment could play out over years, in fits and starts.


Conclusion: Capitalizing on the Dip

- Stable, higher-dividend yielding issues have done poorly in the past couple of months, and utilities have been the worst-performing sector. Even now, stable yield still looks to us decidedly overvalued. Even as it repudiated dividend yield the market has continued to reward companies offering higher free cash flow yields, particularly if they were returning lots of capital to shareholders. The game of shortening the duration of equities, thereby reducing the cash flow at the discretion of managements, has much longer to run.
- We're trying to capitalize on the dip and buy anti-bond market plays, with financials, technology and energy sectors all offering opportunities. Appendices 1 and 2 highlight large- and small-cap issues that stand out in both our core and trading models, while Appendix 3 presents attractive financial issues, of which there are still many.

Conclusions in Brief



● The bull market in bonds is over...

● ...And fortunately, low rates haven't been a big part of the story for the economy...





● ...As many borrowers couldn't access them:

● The argument for emphasizing high-free cash flow yield remains strong...



● ...And the performance of those stocks has been anti-correlated with that of bonds...

● ...As has that of most large-cap financial stocks:




The Bells Tolls: For Whom?

Legitimacy, the End Game

There are two opposing views of what's gone on in financial markets in the last 4½ years. One camp believes that central bank activism inflated asset prices, of both financial and real varieties, by acting as the buyer of last resort. That drug of course proved addictive and there are a lot of users around. As they're weaned off it the grim reality of the situation will sink in. Proponents of this view wield charts that show that the financial markets have responded positively as the Fed and its brethren central banks repeatedly upped the dosage.

The other camp asserts that all of this has been about buying time, and the fundamental problem was that almost 2.5 million too many single-family homes were built, using cheap money (see Exhibit 1). They represented 2% of the stock outstanding, a sizeable overhang. The depressed marks on housing vanished once the effects of distressed sales dissipated, and in some places the recovery has been the mirror image of the collapse (see Exhibit 2). As home equity has gradually been restored, making collateral once again available, the engine of job growth, new businesses, has come back to life (see Exhibit 3). Job openings in real estate, finance and an array of related consumer cyclical industries have also rebounded (see Exhibit 4). In the end the application of Will proved successful, and animal spirits, the lifeblood of capitalism, were resuscitated. We've long been in that camp.


Exhibit 1: Number of Vacant Homes Relative to the Long-Term Average¹ 2000 Through Q1 2013



Source: Census Bureau, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.


¹Based on average rental and homeowner vacancy rates from 1994 to 2003.

Exhibit 2: Nationwide and California Existing Home Sales: Median Prices 2001 Through May 2013



Source: National Association of Realtors, California Association of Realtors, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Exhibit 3: The U.S. Number of Self-Employed Workers 1990 Through May 2013



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Exhibit 4: Job Openings FIRE, Retailers, Restaurants and Hotels¹ 2000 Through April 2013




Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.

¹FIRE is finance, insurance and real estate. Data smoothed on a trailing three-month basis.


The back-up in interest rates constitutes a legitimate challenge to the positions held by those in the second camp like ourselves. The market was surprised by the optimism seen in the Fed's unemployment forecasts as well as its seemingly laissez-faire attitude toward disinflation. It was unmoved by the nuance of the Central Bank's story and it came to the conclusion that the bell had tolled and a decisive turn in monetary policy was in the cards. The +90 basis point rise in ten-year Treasury yields that's occurred since the outset of May is at the high end of the range we saw as plausible (in such a short period of time). Still, the trajectory of rates isn't far off the longer-term consensus expectation, represented by the black dots in Exhibit 5. It's the slope that's scary. Real yields are once again positive yet remain a hundred or so basis points below what might be considered normal (see Exhibit 6). As shown in the bars at the right hand side of the chart, that's least true when the disinflationary impulse imported from the rest of the world is taken into account. Of course we started off with a term premium that was decidedly negative.

Exhibit 5: Ten-Year U.S. Treasury Bond Yields 2006 Through 2015E



Source: Federal Reserve Board, *Wall Street Journal*, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Exhibit 6: Real Ten-Year U.S. Treasury Bond Yields' Using Various Deflators 1952 Through Late-June 2013




Source: Federal Reserve Board, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

'Since 1952 for Core CPI (overall CPI used prior to 1958), since 1969 for trimmed, since 1960 for PCE.

The Interest Rate Sensitivity of the Economy: Less Than Before


We believe that the interest rate sensitivity of the economy is today less than normal. In the post-Crisis period credit creation has played a much smaller role in growth than it had in the prior five decades, and private-sector borrowing amounted to just shy of 4% of GDP (see Exhibit 7). Mortgage lending accounts for most of that shortfall, and new originations have funded less than half the value of new and existing home purchases, compared to an average of almost 80% from 2000 through 2007 (see Exhibit 8). In the formerly-hot market states, where the recovery has been most vigorous, investors have accounted for the bulk of activity, and for them, the yield backdrop remains supportive (see Exhibits 9 and 10). Affordability is still good everywhere because the troughs in the prices and rates were so extreme. Exhibits 11 and 12 present the data for Los Angeles and Boston.

Exhibit 7: Private-Sector Borrowing Relative to GDP' 1955 Through Q1 2013




Source: Federal Reserve Board, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.
'Annualized quarterly data, smoothed on a trailing two-year basis.

Exhibit 8: Purchase Mortgage Originations as a Share of the Dollar Volume of New and Existing Home Sales 2000 Through 2007 and Q3 2011 Through Q2 2013E



Source: Mortgage Bankers Association, National Association of Realtors, Census Bureau.


Exhibit 9: Formerly-Hot Market States
All-Cash Purchases as a Share of Existing Home Sales
April 2013¹



Source: Economist Tom Lawler, Florida Association of Realtors, Dataquick, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.


¹Florida data as of May 2013.

Exhibit 10: Rental Yields on Residential Properties
Spread Versus Ten-Year Treasury Bond Yields
1960 Through Late-June 2013



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.


Exhibit 11: Los Angeles
All-In Cost of Homeownership¹
Measured Relative-to-Income
1987 Through 2012



Source: Christopher Mayer at Columbia University, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

¹Includes the cost of maintenance and property taxes, the tax benefits from mortgage interest deductions, the risk premium required by home-owners and the risk free rate less expected home price appreciation.
²Assumes home price appreciation of +20% in 2013 and +2% income growth.

Exhibit 12: Boston
All-In Cost of Homeownership¹
Measured Relative-to-Income
1987 Through 2012



Source: Christopher Mayer at Columbia University, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.


¹Includes the cost of maintenance and property taxes, the tax benefits from mortgage interest deductions, the risk premium required by home-owners and the risk free rate less expected home price appreciation.
²Assumes home price appreciation of +10% in 2013 and +2% income growth.

It's not only the price of credit that matters, and in recent years the availability of it has been deterministic for activity. It's been tight, and the odds of a borrower with a FICO score of 680 or below, more than a third of the population, getting a mortgage have been (85)% less than where they were during the housing boom (see Exhibit 13). Liquidity for borrowers with lower credit scores has however been gradually recovering, evidenced by increasing prepayment speeds.

What's key is that many borrowers weren't able to avail themselves of the record-low rates, and the gap between the rate they're actually paying and the marginal one peaked at a record +150 basis points at the end of last year (see Exhibit 14). Even now, after the rise in yields, it's still around +50 basis points.


The bottom line is that the interest-rate sensitivity of the economy is generally greatest when credit has been easy, and borrowers have been able to avail themselves of it. That's far from where we've been, instead cash has been king. The excess isn't among borrowers, it's among investors. We'll now turn to their behavior.

Exhibit 13: Purchase Mortgage Originations Change by Credit Score February 2013 Compared to the End-of-2006



Source: Lender Processing Services, Federal Reserve Board, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Exhibit 14: Mortgage Rates The Spread Between Marginal Rates and Those Actually Paid by Borrowers 1990 Through Late-June 2013




Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association.

The Weight of Money is Large, and a Little Worrisome


While the low interest rate era didn't foster a broad-based boom in borrowing, it did create one among bond investors of many ilks. For example, since the outset of 2009, the cumulative inflows into bond mutual funds and ETFs have amounted to \$1.3 trillion, and the assets of those funds now total almost \$4 trillion. Over the last 4½ years consumers have reallocated 16% of the financial assets under their direct control into those vehicles (see Exhibit 15). Most of that money went in when Long Bond yields were below 3%, a scary thought. There's also a substantial sum of money, around \$125 billion, in closed-end bond funds, where the use of leverage is common (see Exhibit 16). It amounts to just over a quarter of their assets, or \$34 billion. That sum is dwarfed though by the leverage underlying bond positions in hedge funds.

Exhibit 15: Bond Mutual Funds and ETFs¹ Net Cash Inflow as a Share of Household's Discretionary Financial Assets at an Annual Rate and Ten-Year Treasury Bond Yields 1987 Through Mid-June 2013



Source: Investment Company Institute, Federal Reserve Board, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Exhibit 16: Domestic Closed-End Bond Funds Net Assets and Leverage Ratios by Category As of Mid-2013




Source: Nuveen Closed End Fund Database.

¹ETF data begins in Q3 2002.

Retail financial advisors have helped their clients "de-risk" their portfolios, and for years now they've been liquidating equities and shifting the proceeds into bonds (see Exhibit 17). Independent investment advisors have led the charge into bond-based ETFs, as they were drawn to their low fees, brand names and liquidity. Those tradable vehicles now have more than \$250 billion in assets, up from \$100 billion a few years ago. The assets of the top ten were \$142 billion at the end-of-April and now they are \$128 billion. The lure of liquidity has been ramped up over time as tactical asset allocation has become a bigger part of what advisors do.

As a rule we don't believe that flows of funds determine asset prices because generally the market is smarter than the participants that make it up. The behavior of the crowd can though, in certain circumstances, affect the pace of change. This could be one of those times because the asset class was seen as safe, and the run into it built on itself over a number of years. Consistent with that we expect that when the June data is available it will show record-setting outflows from these products.


**Exhibit 17: Mutual Fund Net Inflows
By Category and Distribution Channel
2012**



Source: Strategic Insight Simfund.

¹Excluding Merrill Lynch.
²Includes dual-registered reps.

**Exhibit 18: Long-Term Treasury Bonds
Bear Market Outcomes¹
1958 Through Late-June 2013**



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Ibbotson, Bloomberg LP, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.


¹There are a total of 36 observations ranging from 2 to 11 months in length. Returns are for 20-year Treasuries prior to 1973 and 30-year maturities thereafter.

Bear Markets in Bond Sell-Offs: The Empirical Evidence

Interest rates bottomed a year ago and since then the 30-year Treasury Bond has produced a total return of around (16)%. The losses on the Ten-Year are less than half as great. Even so, this will go down as one of the worst episodes for the bond market in the post-WWII era (see Exhibit 18). Even the holders of Vanguard's Total Bond Market Index Fund, the epitome of diversification, have *felt* losses lately (see Exhibit 19). That only happened once before, during the depths of the financial crisis.


Generally equities have gone nowhere during deep bear markets in bonds (see Exhibit 20). Their performance of the last twelve months, +20%, is at odds with the precedents. We think that's because a year ago they were priced to real earnings yields of 5% and as such offered real value. That yield is now 4.6%, still a top-quartile observation. High-dividend-yielding issues generally perform worse than the market during periods of rising rates, and that's been true again this time (see Exhibit 21). Not surprisingly, equities do very well when the bear market in bonds ends (see Exhibit 22).

**Exhibit 19: Bond Market Experiential Returns
1990 Through Late-June 2013**



Source: The Vanguard Group, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.


**Exhibit 20: Large-Capitalization Stocks
Total Returns During Bear Markets in Bonds¹
1958 Through Late-June 2013**



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Ibbotson, Bloomberg LP, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

¹There are a total of 36 observations ranging from 2 to 11 months in length. Equity returns are capitalization-weighted.


**Exhibit 21: Large-Capitalization Stocks
Top Quintile of Dividend Yield
Total Returns During Bear Markets in Bonds¹
1958 Through Late-June 2013**



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Ibbotson, Bloomberg LP, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

¹There are a total of 36 observations ranging from 2 to 11 months in length. Returns are equally-weighted.

**Exhibit 22: Large-Capitalization Stocks
Total Returns in the Year Following a
Bear Market in Bonds¹
1958 Through Late-June 2013**




Source: Federal Reserve Board, Ibbotson, Bloomberg LP, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

¹There are a total of 36 observations ranging from 2 to 11 months in length. Equity returns are capitalization-weighted.

In the last two months stable, high-dividend-yielding stocks have done very poorly (see Exhibit 23). Even after that underperformance their valuation support still looks weak to us. That group's P/E premium to the market peaked at 25% last July is down to 9%, but over the long run they've sold at a (25)% discount to the market. There could be a long way down from here.


During the recent sell-off in bonds the equity market has rewarded the same attributes it had throughout the last few years: undervalued free cash flow or gross profits, and the aggregate return of capital to shareholders via either dividends or buybacks (see Exhibit 24).

**Exhibit 23: Large-Capitalization Stocks
The Interest Rate Spike:
Relative Returns by Sector
Equally-Weighted Data Compounded
May Through Late-June 2013**



Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

**Exhibit 24: Large-Capitalization Stocks
The Interest Rate Spike:
Relative Returns to Select Factors
Equally-Weighted Data Compounded
May Through Late-June 2013**




Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Conclusion: Looking to Capitalize on the Dip

What's gone on over the past couple of months has more-or-less fit in with the plot line we've had in mind for the recovery, although admittedly the recent spike in rates came in at the high-end of our expectations. The mixture of a blunt Fed, leverage and the huge sums of money that came to the party as it was winding down explain some of that trajectory. We're staying the course, looking for companies that are effectively reducing the duration of their equities by returning a significant share of their free cash flow to shareholders. The average high-free-cash-flow-yielding stock still offers 7.5 percentage points more than that of the Ten-Year Treasury Bond, consistent with where we stood back in the middle-of-2003 (see Exhibit 25). It's worth noting that the relative returns of the high-free-cash-flow-yielders have been anti-correlated with the performance of the Long Bond (see Exhibit 26).


Exhibit 25: Large-Capitalization Stocks
The Top Quintile of Free Cash Flow Yield
Relative to Ten-Year Treasury Bond Yields¹
1953 Through Late-June 2013



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Corporate Reports, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

¹Large-capitalization stocks excludes financial and utilities; equally-weighted data.

Exhibit 26: Large-Capitalization Stocks
Correlation of Relative Returns of the Highest
Quintile of Free Cash Flow Yield¹
with the Total Return of Long Treasury Bonds
1954 Through Late-June 2013




Source: Federal Reserve Board, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

¹Constructed using trailing two-year, capitalization-weighted returns.

The relative returns of the large-cap financial stocks have also been anti-correlated with those of the Long Bond (see Exhibit 27). The latest data point is extreme, and it speaks to the effects of quantitative easing on the system. That's been most true for capital markets firms and life insurers, the most curve-sensitive of the lot (see Exhibit 28). The life insurers have been our favorites because they have the most to gain. That said, we still have a lot of ideas in the sector.


Exhibit 27: Large-Capitalization Financial Stocks
Correlation of Relative Returns with the
Total Return of Long Treasury Bonds¹
1929 Through Late-June 2013



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

¹Constructed using trailing two-year, capitalization-weighted returns.

Exhibit 28: Large-Capitalization Financial Stocks
Correlation of Relative Returns with the
Total Return of Long Treasury Bonds¹
1926 Through Late-June 2013



Source: Federal Reserve Board, Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

¹Constructed using trailing two-year, capitalization-weighted returns. Start date varies.

²Comprised of J.P. Morgan and Bank of America.

To take advantage of the correction we turned to our trading model, that identifies fundamentally-attractive issues that've underperformed their peers lately but otherwise don't have undesirable characteristics. Stocks that rank well in both our core and trading models have outperformed the market at a +9 percentage point annual rate in the recovery. Appendix 1 on page 10 presents a screen of large-cap issues that rank well on both scores and Appendix 2 on page 11 presents a small-cap version. Energy, technology and industrial commodity issues stand out. Appendix 3 on page 13 presents a list of attractive large-cap financials stocks.

Appendix 1: Large-Capitalization Stocks

**Top Quintile of Trading Model and the Top Two Quintiles of Core Model
Core Model Ranking
Sorted by Sector
As of Late-June 2013**

| Symbol | Company | Price | Quintile Ranks (1=Best; 5=Worst) | | | | | Memo: | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|----------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|-------|--|-----------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--|---------|
| | | | Super Factors | | | Earnings Quality and Market Reaction | Core Model Rank | Trading Model Rank | Forward P/E- Ratio | Market Capitalization (\$ Billion) | |
| | | | Valuation | Capital Deployment | Trend | | | | | | |
| Capital Equipment | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SPW | SPX CORP | \$71.25 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 16.4 | x | \$3.3 |
| PHG | KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS ELECTRONICS -ADR | 26.94 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 16.0 | | 26.3 |
| FLR | FLUOR CORP | 58.61 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 14.4 | | 9.5 |
| Commercial Services | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MCO | MOODY'S CORP | \$57.64 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 16.5 | x | \$12.8 |
| Industrial Commodities | | | | | | | | | | | |
| LYB | LYONDELLBASELL INDUSTRIES NV | \$65.03 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10.8 | x | \$37.4 |
| TCK | TECK RESOURCES LTD | 20.27 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 10.8 | | 11.8 |
| CF | CF INDUSTRIES HOLDINGS INC | 176.33 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 7.5 | | 10.7 |
| CE | CELANESE CORP | 43.69 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10.1 | | 7.0 |
| SEE | SEALED AIR CORP | 22.80 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 20.2 | | 4.5 |
| IP | INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO | 42.89 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 12.3 | | 19.0 |
| RKT | ROCK-TENN CO | 99.97 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 13.8 | | 7.2 |
| ROC | ROCKWOOD HOLDINGS INC | 62.09 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 19.3 | | 4.8 |
| Transports | | | | | | | | | | | |
| DAL | DELTA AIR LINES INC | \$17.36 | 2 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7.0 | x | \$14.9 |
| UNP | UNION PACIFIC CORP | 149.34 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 15.9 | | 69.8 |
| CNI | CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAY CO | 93.98 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | NM | | 39.9 |
| EXPD | EXPEDITORS INTERNATIONAL WASH INC | 36.71 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 20.9 | | 7.6 |
| Technology | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CSCO | CISCO SYSTEMS INC | \$24.06 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 11.8 | x | \$127.9 |
| INTC | INTEL CORP | 23.58 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 12.8 | | 116.7 |
| TSM | TAIWAN SEMICONDUCTOR MFG CO | 16.93 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14.0 | | 87.8 |
| HPQ | HEWLETT-PACKARD CO | 23.43 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6.9 | | 45.1 |
| GLW | CORNING INC | 13.96 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10.9 | | 20.6 |
| ATVI | ACTIVISION BLIZZARD INC | 13.49 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 16.2 | | 15.1 |
| STX | SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY PLC | 41.23 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 7.9 | | 14.8 |
| NOK | NOKIA CORP | 3.80 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 66.7 | | 14.1 |
| WDC | WESTERN DIGITAL CORP | 58.54 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7.7 | | 13.9 |
| XRX | XEROX CORP | 8.95 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 8.4 | | 11.0 |
| NVDA | NVIDIA CORP | 14.12 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 20.6 | | 8.2 |
| ADSK | AUTODESK INC | 33.48 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 17.6 | | 7.5 |
| MRVL | MARVELL TECHNOLOGY GROUP LTD | 11.01 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13.3 | | 5.4 |
| UMC | UNITED MICROELECTRONICS CORP -ADR | 2.03 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 10.8 | | 5.1 |
| SNDK | SANDISK CORP | 57.70 | 5 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 14.3 | | 14.0 |
| STM | STMICROELECTRONICS NV | 8.70 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 91.3 | | 7.7 |
| BBRY | RESEARCH IN MOTION LTD | 14.10 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | NM | | 7.3 |
| CREE | CREE INC | 58.42 | 5 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 35.6 | | 6.9 |
| SAI | SAIC INC | 12.92 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 11.2 | | 4.4 |
| Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ACT | ACTAVIS INC | \$120.22 | 4 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14.4 | x | \$15.4 |
| LIFE | LIFE TECHNOLOGIES CORP | 74.00 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 17.5 | | 12.7 |
| MTD | METTLER-TOLEDO INTL INC | 202.00 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 19.2 | | 6.1 |
| WCRX | WARNER CHILCOTT PLC | 18.94 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5.8 | | 4.7 |
| Health Care Equipment and Services | | | | | | | | | | | |
| ABC | AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORP | \$53.61 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 16.4 | x | \$12.4 |
| UHS | UNIVERSAL HEALTH SVCS INC | 65.38 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14.7 | | 6.4 |
| THC | TENET HEALTHCARE CORP | 43.73 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14.9 | | 4.5 |
| CYH | COMMUNITY HEALTH SYSTEMS INC | 44.78 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 12.4 | | 4.2 |
| HCA | HCA HOLDINGS INC | 36.60 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 12.0 | | 16.3 |
| Retail, Media, and Other Consumer Cyclical | | | | | | | | | | | |
| None | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Financials | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HIG | HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES | \$28.66 | 2 | 3 | na | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9.1 | x | \$12.5 |
| SLM | SLM CORP | 22.05 | 4 | 1 | na | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8.9 | | 9.8 |
| CNA | CNA FINANCIAL CORP | 31.15 | 1 | 2 | na | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10.2 | | 8.4 |
| GNW | GENWORTH FINANCIAL INC | 10.61 | 2 | 4 | na | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9.0 | | 5.2 |
| BLK | BLACKROCK INC | 245.63 | 4 | 1 | na | 1 | 2 | 1 | 15.6 | | 42.1 |
| EV | EATON VANCE CORP | 36.72 | 5 | 4 | na | 1 | 2 | 1 | 16.8 | | 4.5 |
| Energy | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SU | SUNCOR ENERGY INC | \$28.98 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 9.2 | x | \$43.8 |
| PSX | PHILLIPS 66 | 57.19 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7.5 | | 35.4 |
| MPC | MARATHON PETROLEUM CORP | 70.38 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 7.7 | | 23.0 |
| VLO | VALERO ENERGY CORP | 33.76 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 6.8 | | 18.5 |
| HFC | HOLLYFRONTIER CORP | 40.73 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 7.2 | | 8.3 |
| TSO | TESORO CORP | 51.90 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10.2 | | 7.1 |
| HP | HELMERICH & PAYNE | 61.81 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 11.1 | | 6.6 |
| NBR | NABORS INDUSTRIES LTD | 15.31 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 15.4 | | 4.5 |
| CVI | CVR ENERGY INC | 47.12 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 8.8 | | 4.1 |
| BTU | PEABODY ENERGY CORP | 14.85 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | NM | | 4.0 |
| APA | APACHE CORP | 82.18 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 10.0 | | 32.2 |
| NE | NOBLE CORP | 36.42 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 12.8 | | 9.2 |
| DNR | DENBURY RESOURCES INC | 17.01 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 13.6 | | 6.4 |
| OIS | OIL STATES INTL INC | 89.29 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 13.1 | | 4.9 |
| SPN | SUPERIOR ENERGY SERVICES INC | 25.85 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 12.8 | | 4.1 |
| CZZ | COSAN LTD | 15.34 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 12.3 | | 4.1 |

Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Appendix 2: Small-Capitalization Stocks

**Top Quintile of Trading Model and the Top Two Quintiles of Core Model
With Market Capitalization Greater Than \$400 Million
Core Model Ranking
Sorted by Sector
As of Late-June 2013**

| Symbol | Company | Price | Quintile Ranks (1=Best; 5=Worst) | | | | | | Memo: | | | |
|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------|----------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|---|---|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------|
| | | | Super Factors | | | Earnings | | | Core Model Rank | Trading Model Rank | Forward P/E-Ratio | Market Capitalization (\$ Million) |
| | | | Valuation | Capital Deployment | Quality and Trend | Market Reaction | | | | | | |
| Consumer Durables | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TREX | TREX CO INC | \$45.76 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 18.7 | x | \$786 | |
| REMY | REMY INTERNATIONAL INC | 18.00 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 13.2 | | 576 | |
| PGTI | PGT INC | 7.89 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 23.1 | | 410 | |
| DECK | DECKERS OUTDOOR CORP | 47.35 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 13.8 | | 1,631 | |
| IRBT | IROBOT CORP | 36.68 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 39.9 | | 1,027 | |
| WGO | WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES | 19.72 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 18.1 | | 553 | |
| Capital Equipment | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TEX | TEREX CORP | \$26.01 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 13.6 | x | \$2,872 | |
| MTW | MANITOWOC CO | 16.87 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 14.6 | | 2,252 | |
| BGC | GENERAL CABLE CORP/DE | 29.43 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 13.3 | | 1,464 | |
| HY | HYSTER-YALE MATERIALS HNDLNG | 59.84 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 12.8 | | 1,003 | |
| PIKE | PIKE ELECTRIC CORP | 11.69 | 1 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 14.3 | | 413 | |
| SCTY | SOLARCITY CORP | 32.96 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | NM | | 2,481 | |
| TPC | TUTOR PERINI CORP | 16.89 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 9.2 | | 804 | |
| ARII | AMERICAN RAILCAR INDS INC | 30.39 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 9.0 | | 649 | |
| Commercial Services | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| MINI | MOBILE MINI INC | \$31.25 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 25.5 | x | \$1,443 | |
| PCO | PENDRELL CORP | 2.59 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | NM | | 687 | |
| Industrial Commodities | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TROX | TRONOX LTD | \$19.62 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | NM | | \$2,224 | |
| WLT | WALTER ENERGY INC | 10.60 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | NM | | 663 | |
| Transports | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CAR | AVIS BUDGET GROUP INC | \$27.89 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 12.0 | x | \$3,016 | |
| AAMRQ | AMR CORP/DE | 3.90 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2.1 | | 1,308 | |
| Technology | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| FSL | FREESCALE SEMICONDUCTOR LTD | \$13.38 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 25.6 | x | \$3,385 | |
| AOL | AOL INC | 34.50 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 23.9 | | 2,667 | |
| BRCD | BROCADE COMMUNICATIONS SYS | 5.36 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 8.4 | | 2,427 | |
| ROVI | ROVI CORP | 22.71 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11.5 | | 2,349 | |
| SOHU | SOHU.COM INC | 58.90 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 26.5 | | 2,252 | |
| VSH | VISHAY INTERTECHNOLOGY INC | 13.39 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15.4 | | 1,923 | |
| LXK | LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL INC -CL A | 29.82 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 8.0 | | 1,897 | |
| VLCK | VALUECLICK INC | 23.39 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13.0 | | 1,781 | |
| PLCM | POLYCOM INC | 10.14 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 16.5 | | 1,770 | |
| CLS | CELESTICA INC | 9.03 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | NM | | 1,662 | |
| UBNT | UBIQUITI NETWORKS INC | 17.08 | 4 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 15.2 | | 1,487 | |
| IRF | INTERNATIONAL RECTIFIER CORP | 20.30 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 146.4 | | 1,410 | |
| TIVO | TIVO INC | 10.77 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | NM | | 1,363 | |
| TTWO | TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SFTWR | 14.53 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6.6 | | 1,362 | |
| SYNA | SYNAPTICS INC | 35.15 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11.5 | | 1,140 | |
| SANM | SANMINA CORP | 13.56 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9.4 | | 1,119 | |
| AVG | AVG TECHNOLOGIES NV | 18.76 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | NM | | 1,014 | |
| UIS | UNISYS CORP | 20.29 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 11.8 | | 895 | |
| KLIC | KULICKE & SOFFA INDUSTRIES | 10.69 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 12.1 | | 804 | |
| AMKR | AMKOR TECHNOLOGY INC | 4.03 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 7.5 | | 614 | |
| MX | MAGNACHIP SEMICONDUCTOR CORP | 16.71 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 6.8 | | 592 | |
| CKP | CHECKPOINT SYSTEMS INC | 13.75 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 19.8 | | 562 | |
| ORBK | ORBOTECH LTD | 11.85 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 16.2 | | 514 | |
| FN | FABRINET | 14.08 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | NM | | 488 | |
| PCCC | PC CONNECTION INC | 15.45 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 11.6 | | 403 | |
| BBOX | BLACK BOX CORP | 24.96 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 9.1 | | 403 | |
| LPS | LENDER PROCESSING SERVICES | 31.50 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 12.1 | | 2,675 | |
| SPWR | SUNPOWER CORP | 17.89 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 25.2 | | 2,161 | |
| CLGX | CORELOGIC INC | 22.08 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 12.3 | | 2,106 | |
| SUNE | SUNEDISON INC | 7.52 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 51.9 | | 1,739 | |
| SSTK | SHUTTERSTOCK INC | 49.88 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 63.1 | | 1,672 | |
| ADTN | ADTRAN INC | 23.39 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 33.9 | | 1,434 | |
| CACI | CACI INTL INC -CL A | 60.92 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 10.0 | | 1,404 | |
| OPEN | OPENTABLE INC | 60.54 | 5 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 32.7 | | 1,388 | |
| EFII | ELECTRONICS FOR IMAGING INC | 27.39 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 19.3 | | 1,274 | |
| RSTI | ROFIN SINAR TECHNOLOGIES INC | 25.52 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 17.8 | | 721 | |
| RLD | REALD INC | 14.01 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | NM | | 692 | |
| UNTD | UNITED ONLINE INC | 7.27 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 15.1 | | 669 | |
| LOGM | LOGMEIN INC | 24.01 | 4 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 49.5 | | 586 | |
| LSCC | LATTICE SEMICONDUCTOR CORP | 4.84 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 26.4 | | 559 | |
| SGI | SILICON GRAPHICS INTL CORP | 13.50 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 14.8 | | 457 | |
| SIMG | SILICON IMAGE INC | 5.28 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 17.3 | | 407 | |
| TZOO | TRAVELZOO INC | 26.15 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 22.4 | | 402 | |

Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

Appendix 2 (cont.): Small-Capitalization Stocks

**Top Quintile of Trading Model and the Top Two Quintiles of Core Model
With Market Capitalization Greater Than \$400 Million
Core Model Ranking
Sorted by Sector
As of Late-June 2013**

| Symbol | Company | Price | Quintile Ranks (1=Best; 5=Worst) | | | | | Memo: | | | Market Capitalization (\$ Million) |
|---|------------------------------|---------|----------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|---------|------------------------------------|
| | | | Valuation | Super Factors | | | Core Model Rank | Trading Model Rank | Forward P/E-Ratio | | |
| | | | | Capital Deployment | Earnings Quality and Trend | Market Reaction | | | | | |
| Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology | | | | | | | | | | | |
| TARO | TARO PHARMACEUTICAL INDS LTD | \$54.10 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | NM | \$2,406 | |
| MYGN | MYRIAD GENETICS INC | 26.24 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 14.5 x | 2,094 | |
| CBPO | CHINA BIOLOGIC PRODUCTS INC | 21.42 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 12.0 | 575 | |
| ECYT | ENDOCYTE INC | 12.77 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | NM | 459 | |
| SNTS | SANTARUS INC | 20.33 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 23.7 | 1,314 | |
| NDZ | NORDION INC | 7.20 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | NM | 446 | |
| Health Care Equipment and Services | | | | | | | | | | | |
| HLS | HEALTHSOUTH CORP | \$27.71 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 16.7 x | \$2,417 | |
| KND | KINDRED HEALTHCARE INC | 12.61 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10.5 | 682 | |
| WOOF | VCA ANTECH INC | 25.08 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 16.4 | 2,219 | |
| OMI | OWENS & MINOR INC | 33.52 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 17.6 | 2,123 | |
| GTS | TRIPLE-S MANAGEMENT CORP | 21.76 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 10.8 | 619 | |
| Retail, Media, and Other Consumer Cyclical | | | | | | | | | | | |
| CTCM | CTC MEDIA INC | \$11.14 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 11.4 x | \$1,762 | |
| BLC | BELO CORP -SER A COM | 14.00 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 17.7 | 1,453 | |
| SHOS | SEARS HOMETOWN & OUTLET STR | 41.41 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | NM | 957 | |
| BYD | BOYD GAMING CORP | 10.48 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | NM | 911 | |
| OWW | ORBITZ WORLDWIDE INC | 7.54 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4.9 | 793 | |
| FRGI | FIESTA RESTAURANT GROUP INC | 33.62 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 46.3 | 770 | |
| EDMC | EDUCATION MANAGEMENT CORP | 5.47 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 21.7 | 682 | |
| OSTK | OVERSTOCK.COM INC | 25.44 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 24.8 | 602 | |
| SMRT | STEIN MART INC | 13.10 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 21.9 | 574 | |
| EVC | ENTRAVISION COMMUNICATIONS | 5.79 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 28.3 | 502 | |
| HGG | HHGREGG INC | 14.96 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 19.9 | 471 | |
| BGFV | BIG 5 SPORTING GOODS CORP | 19.15 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 16.1 | 419 | |
| GTN | GRAY TELEVISION INC | 7.00 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 21.0 | 405 | |
| SBGI | SINCLAIR BROADCAST GP -CL A | 27.71 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 21.3 | 2,265 | |
| CZR | CAESARS ENTERTAINMENT CORP | 12.25 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | NM | 1,536 | |
| TVL | LIN TV CORP | 14.33 | 2 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 19.3 | 778 | |
| Consumer Staples | | | | | | | | | | | |
| RAD | RITE AID CORP | \$2.76 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 18.8 x | \$2,510 | |
| Financials | | | | | | | | | | | |
| NSM | NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE HOLDINGS | \$36.08 | 3 | 4 | na | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9.1 x | \$3,269 | |
| APO | APOLLO GLOBAL MANAGEMENT LLC | 21.76 | 3 | 3 | na | 1 | 1 | 1 | 6.0 | 2,875 | |
| MBI | MBIA INC | 12.42 | 1 | 3 | na | 1 | 1 | 1 | 13.9 | 2,397 | |
| VRTS | VIRTUS INVESTMENT PTNRS INC | 185.10 | 5 | 4 | na | 1 | 2 | 1 | 22.4 | 1,447 | |
| GFIG | GFI GROUP INC | 3.74 | 3 | 3 | na | 1 | 2 | 1 | 18.1 | 449 | |
| Energy | | | | | | | | | | | |
| OAS | OASIS PETROLEUM INC | \$38.28 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 14.3 x | \$3,583 | |
| PTEN | PATTERSON-UTI ENERGY INC | 19.36 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 14.0 | 2,835 | |
| WNR | WESTERN REFINING INC | 26.89 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 6.9 | 2,300 | |
| DK | DELEK US HOLDINGS INC | 28.60 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 7.0 | 1,683 | |
| GTE | GRAN TIERRA ENERGY INC | 5.58 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9.2 | 1,577 | |
| SGY | STONE ENERGY CORP | 20.96 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 8.0 | 1,020 | |
| ALJ | ALON USA ENERGY INC | 14.92 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 8.3 | 932 | |
| PKD | PARKER DRILLING CO | 4.87 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 19.2 | 580 | |
| PBF | PBF ENERGY INC | 24.15 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 6.7 | 570 | |
| BAS | BASIC ENERGY SERVICES INC | 12.10 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | NM | 511 | |
| TGA | TRANSGLOBE ENERGY CORP | 5.82 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 5.0 | 430 | |
| SFL | SHIP FINANCE INTL LTD | 14.57 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 13.1 | 1,242 | |
| ANR | ALPHA NATURAL RESOURCES INC | 5.05 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | NM | 1,115 | |
| CLD | CLOUD PEAK ENERGY INC | 16.75 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 18.6 | 1,019 | |
| CRK | COMSTOCK RESOURCES INC | 16.18 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 1 | NM | 782 | |
| ACI | ARCH COAL INC | 3.65 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 5 | 2 | 1 | NM | 775 | |
| Telecommunications | | | | | | | | | | | |
| IDT | IDT CORP | 19.13 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 12.3 x | \$437 | |
| NIHD | NII HOLDINGS INC | 5.79 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | NM | 994 | |

Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis.

**Appendix 3: Large-Capitalization Financial Stocks
Top Two Quintiles of Core Model
Core Model Ranking Report
Sorted by Rank and Capitalization Within Industry
As of Late-June 2013**

| Symbol | Company | Price | Quintiles (1=Best, 5=Worst) | | | | | | | | | | | Market Capitalization (\$ Billion) | |
|---|----------------------------------|----------|-----------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|--------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------------|-------------------|------------------------------------|---------|
| | | | Valuation | | | Capital Deployment | | | | Memo: | | | | | |
| | | | Book Value | Price to: Estimated Earnings | Normalized Earnings | Valuation | Dividend Growth | Change in Shares Outstanding | Capital Deployment | Market Reaction | Core Model Rank | Trading Model Rank | Forward P/E-Ratio | | |
| Banks and Diversified Financials | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| JPM | JPMORGAN CHASE & CO | \$52.08 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 9.2 | x | \$197.4 |
| C | CITIGROUP INC | 47.00 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 10.1 | | 143.0 |
| BAC | BANK OF AMERICA CORP | 12.67 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 13.2 | | 137.1 |
| PNC | PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP INC | 72.70 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 10.7 | | 38.5 |
| CMA | COMERICA INC | 39.67 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 13.2 | | 7.4 |
| Capital Markets | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| GS | GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC | \$153.06 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 10.6 | x | \$73.3 |
| STT | STATE STREET CORP | 64.84 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 14.4 | | 29.5 |
| AMP | AMERIPRISE FINANCIAL INC | 79.26 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 11.7 | | 16.0 |
| MS | MORGAN STANLEY | 25.03 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 11.6 | | 49.1 |
| BLK | BLACKROCK INC | 252.58 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 15.6 | | 43.3 |
| BK | BANK OF NEW YORK COMPANY INC | 28.27 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 12.8 | | 32.8 |
| Consumer Finance | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SLM | SLM CORP | \$22.92 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 8.9 | x | \$10.2 |
| COF | CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP | 61.11 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 2 | 3 | 9.3 | | 35.7 |
| DFS | DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES INC | 46.22 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 9.7 | | 22.8 |
| Life Insurers | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| PRU | PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL INC | \$71.09 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 8.6 | x | \$33.2 |
| HIG | HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES | 29.18 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 9.1 | | 12.7 |
| PFG | PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL GROUP INC | 36.99 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 11.1 | | 10.8 |
| LNC | LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP | 35.54 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 7.9 | | 9.5 |
| UNM | UNUM GROUP | 28.75 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 8.9 | | 7.7 |
| TMK | TORCHMARK CORP | 64.60 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 11.4 | | 6.0 |
| MET | METLIFE INC | 44.82 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 8.2 | | 49.0 |
| AFL | AFLAC INC | 56.82 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 5 | 9.2 | | 26.5 |
| P&C Insurers | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| XL | XL GROUP PLC | \$29.76 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 10.3 | x | \$8.7 |
| CNA | CNA FINANCIAL CORP | 31.61 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 10.2 | | 8.5 |
| RE | EVEREST REINSURANCE GROUP LTD | 124.55 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 7.3 | | 6.2 |
| ACE | ACE LTD | 86.38 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 10.6 | | 29.4 |

Source: Empirical Research Partners Analysis.